Before the abovementioned cases the position was as follows: Section 49(1), 6 which has not been struck down by the Constitutional Court, allows the use of reasonable force in the circumstances where a person:
(a) resists against an attempt to arrest him; and (b) flees when it is clear that there is an attempt to arrest him or resists and then flees. (2) . 19 The court held however, that it was a common law requirement, which the court had to apply.
Subsection (2), prior to it being struck down by the Constitutional Court in the
The accused also had to show the absence of culpa ie that he was not negligent with regard to the requirements set out in section 49(2). 20 Where it was not the intention of the person attempting the arrest to bring the suspect to justice and there was no reasonable suspicion that the suspect committed a schedule 1 21 offence, the person attempting the arrest had no right to shoot at the fleeing suspect (either to kill or wound) and if he did so he was liable in accordance with the common law. 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT'S APPROACH

49(1) and (2)
27 were unconstitutional to the extent that it legally sanctioned the use of force to prevent the flight of a suspect. It must be stressed that the judgement also does not say that a dangerous fugitive should be allowed to make an escape when the use of force is all that can prevent it. What is interesting about the judgement is that potentially deadly force to arrest a fleeing suspect may also be utilised when he has committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious bodily harm irrespective of whether the suspect poses an immediate threat of serious bodily harm to others at the stage of arrest. Cognisance is clearly given to the right of 'Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or ill, it teaches the whole people by its example.'
It is clear that there is a heavy duty placed on the state to set the example for its citizens. The state should not be allowed to take this duty lightly. It is therefore worrying that despite the fact that the proposed amendment was adopted by
Parliament in October 1998, assented to by the President on 20 November 1998, and published on 11 December 1998 it has not yet been put into operation.
Apparently promulgation was at first delayed to enable police training to take 
CONCLUSION.
The court repeatedly stated that it only dealt with an evaluation of section 49 50 and not with the principles of private defence. The fear that the effect of the judgement will be to endanger the lives of the police effecting arrests, and that once again the rights of the offender are protected by the constitution to the detriment of the innocent, is not well founded.
A police officer or any other person whose life is endangered or threatened still has his or her right to self-defence. The court acknowledged the fact that under certain circumstances it is lawful to use force, including deadly force, on a person suspected of having committed a crime, and who resists arrest or tries to escape arrest.
What is however also of interest in this case is the express accepting again by the constitutional court of the principle that the state ought to play an exemplary role. In this case in promoting a culture of respect for human life and dignity.
It is ironic that in this matter on another aspect the state is not playing an exemplary role. Despite the court's clear finding that the power conferred on the State President by section 16 of the Judicial Matters Second Amendment Act 52 to fix a date for its commencement, is a public power and has to be exercised lawfully for the purpose for which it was given, a date for the commencement of the Act has not yet been fixed. More than four years have already passed since October 1998 when the Act was adopted by parliament.
Hereby the principle of separation of powers as between executive, legislature and judiciary, which is acknowledged by the constitution, is breached. The practical implication of the present position is in effect that the president is vetoing or at least preventing the implementation of the Judicial Matters Second Amendment Act. This situation ought to be addressed as the impression is 51 Ibid. 52
Act 122 of 1998. created that the state itself does not act in accordance with the constitution and certainly does not comply with the principle that it should play an exemplary role.
